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BANKRUPTCYS FRESH START VS. ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP: STATUTORY SCHIZOPHRENIA
MICHAEL A. BLOOMt
T HIS article takes a hard look at the exacerbating conflict be-
tween bankruptcy and environmental law, especially after the,
Third Circuit's recent decision in In re Torwico Electronics, Inc.' First,
this Article outlines the two-step analysis required in administering
environmental obligations in bankruptcy. Next, it examines the
pertinent case law for each step of the analysis. Finally, this Article
attempts to craft a synthesized approach to resolving environmental
obligations in bankruptcy, taking into account judicial economies,
public policy and the objectives of both bankruptcy and environ-
mental laws. In so doing, the author hopes to simplify and clarify
one of the most controversial and confusing areas in bankruptcy
and environmental law today.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, ("Code")2
primarily aims to discharge all claims against debtors3 and provide
them with a "fresh start," free of prior debts at the completion of
the case. 4 In contrast, the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")5 aims to im-
t Michael A. Bloom is a senior partner at the law firm of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, where he serves as co-chairman of its Bankruptcy and Reorganization
Practice Group. The author wishes to thank Howard A. Cutler, a student at Tem-
ple University School of Law and a participant in the 1994 summer associate pro-
gram at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, for his assistance in preparing this article.
1. 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1576 (1994). For a discus-
sion of Torwico, see infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
3. Id. § 727(b) (discharge of pre-petition debts under Chapter 7); id.
§ 1141(d)(1)(A) (confirmation of plan of reorganization discharges pre-petition
debts under Chapter 11). A debt is defined as a "liability on a claim." Id.
§ 101(12).
4. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266 (defining "claim" broadly to provide "broadest possible
relief" for debtor in bankruptcy); see also In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d
1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Bankruptcy cleaves the [Chapter 11 debtor] in two
. .[with] [e]xisting claims ... satisfied exclusively from existing assets, while the
new firm ... carries on to the extent current revenues allow.").
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
(107)
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pose liability on potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") 6 for
damage caused by the release or threatened release of a hazardous
material. 7 Under CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") can enforce cleanup liability by: (1) cleaning up a hazard-
ous site and then seeking reimbursement ("response costs") from a
responsible party pursuant to section 107; or (2) compelling a re-
sponsible party to clean up a site through an injunction under sec-
tion 106.8 In addition, most states have enacted cleanup or
disclosure laws, such as New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Re-
sponsibility Act ("ECRA"), 9 which must be followed prior to trans-
fer or closure of a site.10
Because the costs of complying with environmental regulations
can be high, many companies have been forced to seek protection
in bankruptcy in hopes of ultimately discharging their debts upon
confirmation of the reorganization plan.1" In assessing whether a
debtor filing under Chapter 11 of the Code ("Chapter 11
debtor")1 2 may discharge an environmental liability, courts have
employed a two-step analysis: (1) whether the liability is a "claim"
for purposes of the Code; and (2) whether the claim arose pre-peti-
tion or post-petition. 13
6. Under CERCLA, a PRP is any former or present owner and operator, waste
generator or transporter of waste to the site in question. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). A PRP is strictly liable for the cost incurred by the government in re-
sponse to the presence of hazardous materials. Id.
7. See id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
8. CERCLA §§ 106, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. In addition, CERCLA per-
mits any state or other individual to undertake a cleanup and attempt to recover
from a PRP. Id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pac. R.R., 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993) (action by PRP against debtor's succes-
sor where debtor previously owned site).
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6-35 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). The purpose of
this law is to provide adequate preparation and implementation of cleanup proce-
dures for hazardous substances and wastes. Id. § 13:K-7.
10. Id. § 13:1K-6-14.
11. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 999 (2d Cir. 1991) (debtor
listed twenty-four pages of EPA claims in its schedule of liabilities). The provisions
of a confirmed plan of reorganization bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities
under the plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the
debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor, equity security
holder, or general partner is impaired under the plan and whether or not these
individuals have accepted the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
12. A corporation files a petition pursuant to Chapter 11 when they are con-
tinuing in business. Under Chapter 11, the corporation must file their reorganiza-
tion plan, and the creditors must approve it. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29 (providing
explanation of plan procedures).
13. See KATHRYN R. HEIDT, ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS IN BANKRUTCv
3.01, at 3-2 (1993) (stating that two key issues in understanding treatment of envi-
ronmental obligations in bankruptcy are: (1) whether the obligation is a claim
under Code; and (2) when a claim arises).
2
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II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A CLAIM?
Section 101 (5) of the Code provides that a claim is a right to
payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of perform-
ance where that breach gives rise to a right to payment.' 4 Courts
consistently have grappled with whether an environmental obliga-
tion constitutes a claim for purposes of the Code. An obligation
adjudged a claim is rendered dischargeable' 5 after confirmation of
the plan of reorganization.' 6 Conversely, an obligation which is not
deemed a claim remains outside or "passes through" the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and the party seeking to enforce the environ-
mental obligation may proceed against the reorganized debtor.' 7
The leading case in the area of environmental obligations in
bankruptcy is Ohio v. Kovacs18 In Kovacs, the United States Supreme
Court held that where the state divested a debtor of all property
available to assist in performing the required cleanup and simply
was seeking the payment of money, the state had a "right to pay-
ment." According to the Court, this right constitutes a dischargea-
ble claim under the Code. 19 The debtor in Kovacs failed to comply
with a pre-petition state injunction mandating the removal of haz-
ardous waste.20 In response, the state appointed a receiver to take
control of the site as well as the debtor's other assets and undertake
the cleanup.2'
14. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
15. A discharge is a release of the debtor from further personal liability for
pre-bankruptcy debts. If the debtor is granted a discharge under Chapter 7, all an
unsecured creditor receives is its pro-rata distribution. See id. § 727.
16. Id. § 1328(a). See also id. § 1129 (confirmation of a plan).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
18. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
19. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283.
20. Id. at 276.
21. Id. The debtor was the chief executive officer and shareholder of a corpo-
ration that operated an industrial waste site. Id. After the state sued the debtor
and the corporation under state environmental regulations, the debtor, acting in
his individual capacity and on behalf of the corporation, entered into a settlement
stipulation with the state. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276. The stipulation enjoined the
corporation and the debtor from causing further air or water pollution, prohibited
transporting additional industrial waste to the site, mandated removal of specified
waste from the site and ordered the payment of $75,000 in compensation. Id.
When the debtor failed to comply with the stipulation, the state obtained an order
for the appointment of a receiver and the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 11. Id. The debtor eventually converted the petition to a liquidation pro-
ceeding under Chapter 7. Id. at 276 n.1. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (providing for
voluntary conversion by debtor from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7).
1995]
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Appointment of the receiver eliminated the debtor's ability to
comply with the injunction. 22 Therefore, the state wanted payment
of money damages from the debtor. These money damages consti-
tute a "claim" within the meaning of the Code. 23 In dicta, the
Court noted that its holding did not address the situation in which
there had not been a pre-petition appointment of a receiver. 24
Thus, the Kovacs holding is limited in its application.
Furthermore, the Court indicated that prospective environ-
mental regulatory remedies may not be dischargeable under the
Code. 25 This carefully articulated limitation had the effect of alert-
ing the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that a case involving
forward-reaching injunctive relief could be decided differently.
Thus, after Kovacs, a court could hold that a prospective order from
an environmental regulatory agency is not a claim under the Code
and therefore such an obligation would be nondischargeable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
took just this step in deciding In re Chateaugay Corp.26 In Chateaugay,
the Second Circuit held that an EPA order which focused on the
dual objectives of alleviating continued pollution and removing ac-
cumulated waste did not constitute a claim under the Code. 27 In
Chateaugay, the Chapter 11 debtor, LTV Corporation, had filed its
schedule of liabilities, which included twenty-four pages of contin-
gent claims of EPA and state environmental enforcement agen-
22. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283. When the debtor failed to clean up the site as he
was obligated to do under the settlement stipulation, the state secured the appoint-
ment of a receiver who took possession of the debtor's nonexempt assets and the
assets of the corporate defendants. Id. at 282-83. Thus, this course of action
divested the debtor of assets that might have been used to clean up the site.
23. See id. at 283 (noting that state conceded that only performance sought
from debtor was payment of money). For a discussion of how payment of money is
a claim under the Code, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24. Id. at 284. This determination apparently was left for the circuits to re-
solve. Furthermore, the Court noted that, absent appointment of a receiver pre-
petition, a bankruptcy trustee who enjoys the power of abandonment under the
Code could have minimized the debtor's obligations. Id. at 284-85 n.12 (citing 11
U.S.C. § 554 (providing that after notice and hearing, trustee may abandon prop-
erty that is burdensome to estate or that is of inconsequential value to estate)).
25. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284-85 (explaining that Court does not hold "that the
injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises ... is dischargea-
ble in bankruptcy," nor that possessor of site may fail to comply with local environ-
mental regulations).
26. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 1008 ("Any order that to any extent end, or ameliorates continued
pollution is not an order for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a right of
payment and is for that reason not a 'claim.' ").
4
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cies.28 LTV and EPA disagreed over whether response costs
incurred by EPA after the bankruptcy court confirmed LTV's plan
of reorganization were discharged at confirmation because these
costs constituted claims under the Code.29
In holding that an order containing prospective injunctive re-
lief is nondischargeable, the Second Circuit factually distinguished
Chateaugay from Kovacs. This was because in Kovacs the State made
a pre-petition appointment of a receiver which prevented the
debtor from undertaking any action to comply with the state injunc-
tion.30 The Court read Kovacs to stand for the proposition that any
order focusing on alleviating or ending environmental pollution is
nondischargeable. 31 Thus, Chateaugay appears to provide environ-
mental regulatory agencies with a prescription for nondis-
chargeability of environmental claims: include a directive for
prospective relief in the injunction to remove current waste and
cease continued pollution.
In Torwico, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit expanded the Chateaugay holding to encompass prospective
relief even if the debtor no longer owns or occupies the contami-
nated property.32 In Tonvico, the Third Circuit held that efforts of
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and En-
ergy ("NJDEPE") to compel a Chapter 11 debtor to clean up envi-
ronmental waste that represents a continuing danger does not
constitute a claim for purposes of the Code.33
28. Id. at 999. EPA subsequently filed a $32 million proof of claim in LTV's
bankruptcy. Id. The $32 million represents pre-petition response costs from 14
sites where LTV had been identified as a PRP. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999. For a
discussion of PRPs, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. Id. Typically, confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from liability
on all claims that arose prior to confirmation, whether pre-petition or post-peti-
tion. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d) (1) (A).
30. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008-09. For a discussion of the appointment of
the receiver in Kovacs, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
31. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1009 ("[T]o the extent an order is obtained under
CERCLA or any other environmental statute that seeks to end or ameliorate pollu-
tion .... nothing in Kovacs permits a discharge of such obligation.").
32. Torwico, 8 F.3d at 151. In finding the environmental obligation nondis-
chargeable, the court was not persuaded by the assertion that the debtor "no
longer owns or occupies the land." Id.
33. Id. The NJDEPE found a hidden seepage pit which contained hazardous
materials and determined that the waste was mixing with the local water supply.
Id. at 147. In holding that the NJDEPE did not have a claim for purposes of bank-
ruptcy, the Torwico court determined that the NJDEPE was attempting to obligate
the debtor to " 'ameliorat[e] ongoing pollution emanating from [accumulated]
wastes' " which posed an ongoing and continuing danger. Torwico, 8 F.3d at 150
(quoting Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008).
19951
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The Third Circuit reasoned that where a debtor has access to
the contaminated facility and was the generator of the hazardous
waste within the meaning of the state regulation, the debtor's obli-
gations "run with the waste," regardless of whether the debtor pres-
ently owns or operates the property. 34 Thus, to the extent that the
debtor's waste constitutes a continuing hazard, environmental obli-
gations are not claims under the Code and therefore are nondis-
chargeable. As a result, a Chapter 11 debtor (at least in the Third
Circuit) must contend with this cleanup obligation even after con-
firmation of its plan of reorganization.3 5
III. To)wco: A CASE DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In Torwico, the debtor operated a manufacturing business on a
leased site until September 1985 when it moved its operations from
the property.3 6 Shortly thereafter, Torwico filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Code, and in its schedules, Torwico
listed both the NJDEPE and the Attorney General of New Jersey as
unsecured creditors holding disputed, unliquidated claims.3 7 The
NJDEPE then issued an administrative order directing Torwico to
take certain remedial actions concerning a hidden seepage pit con-
taining hazardous wastes. 38 The order expressly addressed poten-
tial conflicts with the Code, maintaining that the obligations which
it imposed did not constitute a dischargeable debt.3 9
34. Id. at 150.
35. Id. The Torwico court noted that the NJDEPE simply was exercising its
regulatory and police powers to remedy an existing and ongoing hazardous waste
site. Id. at 151. Thus, the NJDEPE was not seeking money damages for past con-
duct, but instead was attempting to preclude future environmental damage.
Torico, 8 F.3d at 151. But see Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282-83 (state conceded that only
performance sought from debtor was payment of money).
36. Torwico, 8 F.3d at 147.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 148. The administrative order provided that " '[n]o obligations im-
posed [by this order] . . . are intended to constitute a debt, damage claim, penalty
or other civil action which should be limited or discharged in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.' " Id. (quoting Administrative Order and Notice of Civil Administrative
Penalty Assessment issued by NJDEPE to Torwico Elec., Inc.). The order further
noted that all obligations were imposed by the NJDEPE pursuant to the state's
police powers and were intended to protect the public and environment. Id. An
action by a governmental entity undertaken to enforce the entity's police or regu-
latory powers is excepted from the automatic stay's limitation on the commence-
ment or continuation of proceedings against the debtor. II U.S.C. § 362(b) (4).
See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984)
(focusing on whether action by Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources constituted action to enforce police or regulatory powers, outside scope of
automatic stay).
6
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In affirming the United States District Court for the District of
NewJersey's reversal of the bankruptcy court, the Third Circuit re-
lied extensively on Chateaugay.40 In accordance with Chateaugay's
directive, the Third Circuit found that the seepage pit was a contin-
uing problem because it was leaking hazardous waste into the sur-
rounding environment. Thus, the NJDEPE merely was directing
the debtor to "amerliorat[e] ongoing pollution."41 In so doing, the
Third Circuit expanded the group of parties potentially responsible
for prospective environmental relief from present owners to prior
lessees.
Chateaugay and Torwico significantly undermine the "fresh
start" objective of the Code. Following the prescription of Chateau-
gay's dictum, environmental regulators now can seek to preclude a
bankruptcy court from finding that an environmental obligation is
a claim by limiting their initial demands to prospective injunctive
relief. In Torwico, the Third Circuit extended the Chateaugay analy-
sis to include prior lessees, thereby solidifying the ability of environ-
mental regulators to impose liability on Chapter 11 debtors
operating in bankruptcy. In broadening the range of PRPs to in-
clude not just present owners but prior lessees, the Third Circuit
purported to rely in part on the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re
CMC Heartland Partners.42 Yet, this reliance seems untenable.
There is little factual connection between the situations in Torwico
and CMC Heartland Partners. Unlike Torwico, the PRP in CMC Heart-
land Partners was not the debtor, but a successor to the debtor.43
Second, the PRP in CMC Heartland Partners owned the property at
the time EPA assessed cleanup obligations, while the debtor in
Torwico did not.44 Finally, the CMC Heartland Partners court deter-
mined that a CERCLA section 106 order runs with the land to cur-
rent owners. 45 Without explanation, however, the Torwico court
concluded that a section 106 order runs with the waste to prior
lessees. 46
40. See Torwico, 8 F.3d at 149 (noting that Chateaugay provides insight into
issue of whether debtor's environmental obligations are liabilities on a claim).
The Torwico court also relied on In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th
Cir. 1992). Id.
41. Tonwico, 8 F.3d at 150 (quoting Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008).
42. 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that EPA order to debtor and
owner of site requiring removal and remediation activity based on ownership sur-
vived reorganization).
43. Id. at 1145.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Torwico, 8 F.3d at 146.
1995]
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It is the authors' belief that the Third Circuit's opinion in
Torwico goes too far in favoring environmental regulations over
bankruptcy's "fresh start" objective. 47 Congress intended that the
term "claim" be defined very broadly for purposes of bankruptcy.48
To implement this legislative intent, courts should ensure that envi-
ronmental obligations, designed in part to compel collection of
cleanup costs arising as a result of pre-petition contamination, con-
stitute claims under the Code. This treatment of environmental ob-
ligations especially should hold true for former owners and lessees.
Failure to classify pre-petition environmental obligations as claims
will prevent many debtors with significant cleanup obligations from
emerging from bankruptcy and may cause their eventual liquida-
tion with the attendant loss ofjobs and business. Additionally, envi-
ronmental regulators should assess present owners and lessees for
potential future cleanup obligations, leaving present owners and
prior lessees free to negotiate price modifications and indemnities
to account for the risk of future environmental obligations.
IV. WHEN DOES A CLAIM ARISE? THREE DIFFERING APPROACHES
Once an environmental obligation is deemed a claim under
the Code, the critical issue becomes whether the claim arose pre-
petition or post-petition. 49 Debts arising pre-petition under Chap-
ter 7, or prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization under
47. The bankruptcy court decision in Torwico appears to take the most equita-
ble approach to the conflict between environmental and bankruptcy laws. See In re
Torwico Elec., Inc., 131 B.R. 561, 572 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, Torwico Elec.,
Inc. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 153 B.R. 24 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, In
re Torwico Elec., Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1576 (1994)
(permitting NJDEPE to remove environmental obligations from purview of Code
by designating obligations as regulatory in nature undermines Code's classification
and priority system).
Furthermore, both the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit demonstrate
the difficulties that some courts of general jurisdiction encounter in adjudicating
bankruptcy matters. See Torwico, 153 B.R. at 25-26 (citing Kovacs and three other
opinions without discussing how cases apply to facts of Torwico); Torwico, 8 F.3d at
149-50 (failing to recognize factual distinction between Torwico and CMC Heartland
Partners and noting that Penn Terra has marginal relevance simply because it fo-
cused on automatic stay in context of cleanup action). For a discussion of the
dissimilarities between CMC Heartland Partners and Torwico, see supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text.
48. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6266 (explaining
broad interpretation of "claim" enables Code to deal with all legal obligations of
debtor and to provide broadest possible relief for debtor).
49. The timing of a claim determines whether a party receives any distribu-
tions from the estate, and whether a claim is dischargeable. In addition, only those
impaired claimants whose claims arose pre-petition or who hold administrative ex-
8
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Chapter 11, are dischargeable. 50 Since the Code does not expressly
define when an environmental obligation becomes a claim in bank-
ruptcy, courts have been required to make this determination.
Courts have espoused three different views as to when a claim arises
in bankruptcy. The first, and broadest view, followed by the Second
Circuit, provides that a claim arises once the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances occurs. The second, and narrowest
view, followed by the Third Circuit and the District of Minnesota,
provides that a claim arises only once the cause of action accrues;
under CERCLA, this occurs when response costs are incurred. 51
The third view, adopted by the Northern District of Texas, the
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, adopts the first view and in-
corporates a knowledge or foreseeability requirement. 52
A. Release or Threatened Release
The Second Circuit broadly defined when a claim arises, pro-
viding debtors with ample protection from environmental claims.
In Chateaugay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a claim for response costs arose when a release or
pense obligations can vote on a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126.
In bankruptcy, a creditor may file a proof of claim, which the bankruptcy
court must allow in order for the creditor to share in the distribution. Id. § 501 (a).
A creditor is an entity that has a claim against the debtor which arose at the time of
or before the order for relief. Id. § 101(10) (A). In a voluntary case, the filing of a
petition constitutes the order for relief. Id. § 301. Therefore, an entity who holds
a claim that arose pre-petition is a creditor.
Additionally, the amount of a claim is determined as of the petition date. 11
U.S.C. § 502(b). Only those creditors holding allowed claims may share in a Chap-
ter 7 distribution or vote on a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. Id. §§ 726(a),
1126(a).
Under Section 507(a)(1), administrative expenses are afforded priority in
bankruptcy. Id. § 507(a)(1). Section 503 describes potential administrative ex-
penses, including actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate. Id.
§ 503(b)(1)(A). In addition, certain environmental obligations may be deemed
an exception to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (7) (discharge in Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 does not discharge debt that is fine or penalty payable to and for bene-
fit of governmental unit). Therefore, these obligations may be afforded priority
status to facilitate and improve the prospects of reorganization.
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141(d).
51. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990); cf In re M. Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332 (1984) (indemnity claim does
not arise until suit is instituted), cert. denied, M. Frenville Co., Inc. v. Avellino &
Bienes, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
52. In reJensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Chicago, Milwaulkee, St.
Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992); In re National Gypsum Co., 139
B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
1995]
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threatened release of hazardous substance occurred.53 Because
there was a pre-petition release to the extent that EPA directed the
debtor to clean up existing waste, EPA's claim was dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Thus, under the Second Circuit's approach, virtually
any environmental obligation relating to hazardous waste, provided
the waste was generated pre-petition, is a dischargeable claim.
B. Response Costs Incurred
In United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal,54 the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota held that the mere re-
lease of hazardous materials prior to confirmation of a reorganiza-
tion plan does not give rise to a dischargeable claim under the
Code.55 Instead, the court focused on the four elements of a CER-
CIA obligation, including incurring response costs. 56 Since EPA
had incurred no response costs prior to confirmation of the
debtor's plan of reorganization, the Minnesota Federal District
Court found that EPA had no claim under the Code and was free to
proceed against the reorganized debtor.57  In distinguishing
Chateaugay, the court noted that the debtor could not show that
EPA had actual or presumed knowledge of potential CERCLA
claims against the debtor before confirmation. 58
Although In re M. Frenville Co.59 did not involve environmental
claims in bankruptcy, this decision elucidates the Third Circuit's
position regarding when a claim arises. In M. Frenville Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
under state law, a claim for indemnity or contribution by a Chapter
7 debtor's accounting firm did not arise until the suit was instituted
by the accounting firm.60 Because a right to payment did not arise
53. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1006. See also In reJensen 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1991) (claim arises when debtor commits act), aff'd, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the
United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, adopted a differ-
ent view. SeeJensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (fair contemplation test balances policy objec-
tives of Code and CERCLA). For a discussion of the different standards adopted
by each court in Jensen's appellate process, see infra notes 63-65.
54. 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
55. Id. at 838-39.
56. Id. at 835. The four elements of a legal obligation under CERCLA are:
(1) a facility; (2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at the
facility; (3) a responsible party; and (4) expenditure of necessary response costs by
the United States in responding to the release. Id. at 835 (citing United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)).
57. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. at 836.
58. Id.
59. 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 337.
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until the accounting firm initiated its indemnity suit, and because
the suit was not initiated until fourteen months after the com-
mencement of the debtor's case, the Third Circuit reasoned that
the accounting firm's right to payment did not arise pre-petition.
Therefore, their right to payment was not a claim that could be
discharged. 61
Under a test like this, which focuses on when response costs
are incurred, environmental regulators successfully can avoid dis-
charge of agency claims by deferring assessment of response costs.
Under this frequently criticized approach, virtually all hazardous
waste claims will be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
C. Release or Threatened Release and Foreseeability
In an effort to better balance the objectives of environmental
regulations with the Code's focus on a fresh start, several courts
have adopted a "fair contemplation" test. 62 In In re National Gypsum
Co., 63 the District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that
a debtor's potential liability for future CERCLA response costs gives
rise to dischargeable claims to the extent that the liability could be
fairly contemplated by the parties on the petition date.64 In Na-
tional Gypsum, the debtors objected to the government's proof of
claim, filed on behalf of EPA, which contained seven listed sites and
at least thirteen unlisted sites for which EPA reserved its right to
assert liability.65
In promulgating the "fair contemplation" standard, the court
expressly stated that the Second Circuit in Chateaugay adopted an
overly broad test for when a claim arises; in so doing, the Second
Circuit included costs not fairly contemplated by EPA, including
pre-petition releases of environmental waste not discovered by
EPA."' The court then identified several factors relevant to deter-
mining when the "fair contemplation" standard is satisfied: "knowl-
edge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable,
N[ational] P[riorities] L[ist] listing, notification by EPA of PRP lia-
bility, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and
61. Id.
62. SeeJensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993); In re National Gypsum Co., 139
B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974
F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
63. 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
64. Id. at 407-08.
65. Id. at 400.
66. Id. at 406-07.
1995]
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incurring response costs." 6 7 In addition, the court cautioned that
the "fair contemplation" standard should not be used by an envi-
ronmental regulatory agency to subvert the objectives of the
Code.68 This caution addressed the inherent weaknesses of the dic-
tum in Chateaugay.69
In In re Jensen,70 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that where a state environmental regulatory
agency had sufficient knowledge of the debtor's potential liability
pre-petition, any subsequent environmental liability constitutes a
claim under the Code. 71 In Jensen, the California Department of
Health Services ("CDHS") sued the debtors to recover response
costs expended to clean up waste generated by the debtor's fungi-
cide tanks. 72 Because the waste was generated pre-petition, the
debtors asserted that their 1984 discharge in bankruptcy eliminated
any obligation to satisfy the CDHS claim. 73
The bankruptcy court granted CDHS's motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that environmental obligations did not be-
come claims under the Code until CDHS incurred response costs.7 4
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel applied the release
or threatened release standard described above and reversed the
bankruptcy court.75 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's reversal of the bankruptcy court.
However, the Court rejected the release or threatened release stan-
dard and reasoned that the "fair contemplation" standard ade-
67. National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 408.
68. Id. The court noted that, because no statute of limitations exists under
CERCLA foreclosing EPA response to hazardous waste, regulators may not act
quickly to pursue remedies against a debtor under tile "fair contemplation" stan-
dard. Id. at 408-09.
69. Id. at 406-07 (noting that Chateaugay court departs froin standard it es-
pouses in adopting definition of claim so broad as to encompass costs that could
not "fairly" have been contemplated by EPA pre-petition).
70. 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993).
71. Id. at 931.
72. Id. at 926-27.
73. Id.
74. In reJensen, 114 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990). rev'd, 127 B.R. 27
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993). Since CDHS did not
know of the presence of toxic waste on the debtors' site as of the petition (late, (te
court held that the response costs incurred to clean tip the site were nondischarge-
able. Id. at 705.
75. In reJensen, 127 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 925
(9th Cir. 1993).
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quately balanced the competing policy goals of the Code and
CERCLA.76
The Seventh Circuit similarly adopted a "fair contemplation"
standard. In In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R Co.,7 7
the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit held that a
claim existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("Act") 78 when an
environmental regulatory agency had knowledge that a debtor was
a PRP under CERCLA.79 Where the regulatory agency had knowl-
edge that the debtor was tied to the release of a hazardous sub-
stance prior to the close of the bankruptcy case, yet failed to file a
proof of claim, the agency's claim was discharged and could not be
asserted against the debtor's successor.80
Hence, under the "fair contemplation" standard, courts must
make two determinations: (1) when the regulatory agency identi-
fied the hazardous waste; and (2) when the agency identified the
debtor as a PRP. If the regulator knew of both the presence of the
waste and the debtor's PRP status pre-petition, any ensuing environ-
mental obligation is a claim under the Code and is therefore
dischargeable.
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Code's definition of claim expressly includes rights to pay-
ment or equitable relief that are unmatured or unliquidated.8'
Since bankruptcy looks to substantive, nonbankruptcy law to deter-
mine when a right to payment arises,82 the determination of when
an environmental claim arises in bankruptcy ultimately should bal-
ance the interests of the Code and environmental regulations. As
between the three differing judicial approaches discussed above,
only the foreseeability standard attempts to fashion an equitable
balance of the interests of the Code and environmental regulations.
A test based on when the release or threatened release occurs
unfairly favors a debtor at the expense of both environmental regu-
76. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930 (National Gypsum court carefully balanced compet-
ing policy objectives of Code and environmental laws).
77. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
78. The Bankruptcy Act ofJuly 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title 1, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
79. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d at 786.
80. Id. at 787-88.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
82. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. at 835; In re Cent. R.R. Co. of New
.Jersey, 758 F.2d 936, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); In re Reming-
ton Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1988).
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latory agencies and, ultimately, the public. The primary objective
of environmental laws is to encourage business organizations to
maintain a clean and safe environment. When necessary, regula-
tors require these organizations to incur costs to maintain this ob-
jective. Under a release or threatened release test, once a debtor is
aware of a potential release, it has significant incentives to file im-
mediately for bankruptcy protection.
Under Chapter 11, if environmental regulators discover the
waste post-petition but before plan confirmation, environmental
claims likely will be afforded priority status, thereby eroding estate
assets which otherwise would be available for other creditors. If en-
vironmental regulators do not discover the waste pre-confirmation,
the bankruptcy discharge effectively stays any action by regulators
to collect environmental obligations from the debtor. Thus, envi-
ronmental agencies and the public will be asked to shoulder the
cost of the cleanup.
Conversely, a test based on when response costs are incurred
unreasonably favors environmental regulators and undermines the
"fresh start" objective of the Code. First, under this test, since
claims in bankruptcy do not arise until response costs are incurred,
regulators are encouraged to delay enforcement of environmental
obligations until confirmation or, at a minimum, until after the pe-
tition has been filed. In so doing, regulators will attempt to ensure
that environmental obligations either survive bankruptcy or enjoy
administrative priority. Second, since environmental laws mandate
speedy cleanup at minimal cost to the public, a test based on when
response costs are incurred may encourage regulators to clean up a
site with public funds yet delay assessing response costs against a
potential Code debtor. Third, by saddling a Chapter 11 debtor with
substantial post-confirmation cleanup obligations, regulators may
preclude successful reorganizations tinder the Code and force debt-
ors to liquidate their businesses. Fourth, since different Circuits
have adopted different standards, a test based on incurring re-
sponse costs, which is most onerous to the debtor, encourages debt-
ors to "forum shop" for a Circuit with a more favorable standard.
Finally, courts in both the District of Minnesota and the Third Cir-
cuit either have declined to follow or have sought to distinguish
Union Scrap Iron & Metal and M. Frenville Co., respectively.i
83. See Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D.
Minn. 1991) (adopting "fair contemplation" standard); In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 944 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1991) (contribution action tinder CERCLA did not
arise until legislation was enacted) (citing Cent. R., Co. of N.J., 758 F.2d at 942
14
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A standard based on foreseeability more effectively balances
the objectives of the Code and environmental regulations. Instead
of encouraging debtors and regulators to make tactical decisions
about when and where to file and when and how to impose envi-
ronmental obligations, this standard promotes both environmental
and Code objectives. Once cognizant of a release or a threatened
release, environmental regulators who are able to link hazardous
waste to a debtor are encouraged to assert their claims immediately.
As a result, the bankruptcy court and other creditors are notified at
an early stage of the possibility of a substantial environmental claim
against the estate. Reimbursement for response costs may proceed
more efficiently as regulators need not wait until the close of the
bankruptcy proceedings to commence litigation. Accelerating the
claims assertion and claims resolution processes enhances adminis-
trative efficiency, eliminates expense, and encourages the consen-
sual resolution of claims. At the same time, it provides a debtor
faced with significant environmental claims a fair opportunity to re-
organize under the Code.
A system which facilitates the resolution of all claims against a
debtor in a single forum at a single time would go far toward resolv-
ing the continuing schizophrenia arising out of the tensions be-
tween these two competing sets of federal statutory regulations.
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